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2010年7月28日 (水)

Yes, We Still Kan?!

(2010年7月27日、米戦略国際問題研究所日本部ニュースレター)

掲載サイト:http://csis.org/publication/japan-chair-platform-yes-we-still-kan

Prime Minister Naoto Kan did not enjoy a high approval rating long enough to win the upper house election held on July 11, as the ruling coalition lost its overall majority in the 242-seat chamber. With half of the upper house seats up for election, the biggest opposition party, the Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) gained 13 seats and the newly formed Your Party, which had no seats before this election, gained 10 seats. Both parties received many ballots from independent voters who rooted for the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) during last year’s general election but were subsequently disappointed with the DPJ’s 10 months in government. Nevertheless, the election was far short of a resuscitation of the LDP. In fact, the LDP did a lot worse in terms of its share of the proportional representation vote, compared to the last upper house election in 2007 when it suffered a crushing defeat. Furthermore, it is premature to say that Your Party will become a third pole in Japanese politics; the party does not have any history, which would suggest votes of expectation rather than endorsement.

Political Pandemonium
What is going to happen next? Inevitably, we will see more political pandemonium as witnessed over the last four years. The ruling DPJ remains in power thanks to a big majority in the lower house, but the National Diet will be divided again as a “twisted parliament,” which will certainly paralyze management of the Diet. After experiencing political paralysis during the LDP administrations of Abe, Fukuda, and Aso after the DPJ seized control of the upper house in 2007, people knew the situation would be chaotic again if the DPJ lost the upper house election. But this time many voters chose to support parties other than the DPJ, which could ironically prolong the political chaos affecting our daily lives.

Even though Kan vowed to stay on as prime minister—noting that “I would like to continue to responsibly manage the government”—he cannot say, “Yes, we still Kan” with confidence and may not be able to hang on as president of the DPJ after an election for party president in September. Mr. Kan is Japan’s fifth prime minister in four years and is the thirteenth since 1993. (In contrast, Barack Obama is just the third U.S. president over that period.) We in Japan are unconsciously becoming accustomed to this deviant situation and few people will be surprised to see a new prime minister this fall.

U.S.-Japan Relations
The result of the election itself, however, will not affect foreign policy or the U.S.-Japan relationship – at least for a little while. After the chaotic failure of the Hatoyama administration to maintain a good relationship with the United States over the relocation of U.S. Marine Corps Air Station (MCAS) Futenma in Okinawa, people seemed to recognize the need to reaffirm the importance of U.S.-Japan relations this year, which marks the fiftieth anniversary of the U.S.-Japan Security Treaty. Prime Minister Kan, a pragmatist, reacted by not rocking the boat with Washington and promised to stick with the agreement on the Futenma relocation without hesitation. This changing attitude toward the United States somewhat appeased conservative voters, although it is too early for Washington to welcome it as a permanent shift. The DPJ manifesto for the upper house election repeated key objectives emphasized last year such as revising the bilateral Status of Forces Agreement to realize a “close and equal” relationship with the United States, which suggests Hatoyama’s rhetoric could still resonate within the party.
Hatoyama was wrong to fixate on that theme. As sovereign nations, the United States and Japan are equal in the first place and it is natural for close allies to express their candid opinions to each other on controversial issues.

But Hatoyama seemingly attempted to alter the existing bilateral agreement on Futenma to superficially demonstrate that the two countries are equal and that Japan should not always follow the will of the United States. However, if Japan insisted only on “equality” without assuming a shared burden—as Hatoyama appeared to do—the United States would not stop asking questions such as, “What are Japan’s responsibilities and military roles under the Japan-U.S. security alliance?” or “What can Japan do to help the United States and NATO members win the war in Afghanistan?” Japan and the United States are equal in terms of sovereign status but unfortunately not equal in terms of the power they can bring to bear. The most basic strategy for the Japanese government to keep in mind is how best to secure its national interests and contribute to world peace and prosperity. Needless to say, the United States is Japan’s most important ally in pursuing those objectives.

The relocation of MCAS Futenma will remain the central issue in U.S.-Japan relations. It is up to the Kan administration to strike a chord within the hearts of the Okinawans. Besides the election for DPJ party president in September, Kan has to clear several other hurdles before President Obama visits Japan to attend the Asia-Pacific Economic Cooperation (APEC) summit in November. One is to determine a construction method for the Futenma replacement facility in the area of Henoko by the end of August, which already appears unlikely. The next hurdle will be two local elections in Okinawa: a municipal election in September in Nago City, which Henoko is part of; and the Okinawa gubernatorial election in November. If candidates in either race support the bilateral agreement to construct the new alternative base in Nago City, they are almost certain to lose. The dispute over the base will flare up again more severely than before in the lead-up to these elections. Not only Kan (if he is still prime minister at that time) but the entire nation will face a crucial moment for Japan’s security. I would not deny that Japan will need the Obama administration’s help to end the deadlock on Futenma and keep U.S. military bases to maintain a credible defense posture in the Asia-Pacific region.

Conclusion
Now that the political zeal of the historic new government has vanished, the Kan administration has to tread a thorny path in dealing with extremely difficult issues including the relocation of MCAS Futenma and economic matters such as the huge financial deficit and the need to revive economic growth. Furthermore, it is not easy to survive the grilling by the mass media over policies and scandals, which has already defeated four prime ministers in four years. However, there is a slight chance Kan will govern longer than his predecessors did. The next national election theoretically does not have to take place until 2013, and Kan is a resilient political figure who has already survived various trials and tribulations to reach the top. It is about time for politicians to govern Japan, and the spirit of "Yes, we still Kan!" will be needed to move things forward.

ーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーーHideki Wakabayashi was a member of the House of Councillors (upper house) representing the Democratic Party of Japan (DPJ) 2001–2007 and was a Visiting Fellow at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS) 2007–2008. He submitted this commentary in his current capacity as an Adjunct Fellow with the CSIS Japan Chair.
The Japan Chair invites other essays for the Platform. Please contact Eri Hirano at (202) 775-3144 or by e-mail at ehirano@csis.org.
___________________________________________________________________________________________ Japan Chair Platform is published by the Office of the Japan Chair at the Center for Strategic and International Studies (CSIS), a private, tax-exempt institution focusing on international public policy issues. Its research is nonpartisan and nonproprietary. CSIS does not take specific policy positions. Accordingly, all views, positions, and conclusions expressed in this publication should be understood to be solely those of the author(s).
© 2010 by the Center for Strategic and International Studies. All rights reserved.

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